The influence of two fundamentally different types of uncertainty on the value of oil field production are investigated here. First considered is the uncertainty caused by the fact that the expected value estimate is not one of the possible outcomes. To correctly allow for the risk attendant upon using the expected value as a measure of worth, even with statistically sharp parameters, one needs to incorporate the uncertainty of the expected value. Using a simple example we show how such incorporation allows for a clear determination of the relative risk of projects that may have the same expected value but very different risks. We also show how each project can be risked on its own using the expected value and variance. This uncertainty type is due to the possible pathways for different outcomes even when parameters categorizing the system are taken to be known. Second considered is the risk due to the fact that parameters in oil field estimates are just estimates and, as such, have their own intrinsic errors that influence the possible outcomes and make them less certain. This sort of risk depends upon the uncertainty of each parameter, and also the type of distribution the parameters are taken to be drawn from. In addition, not all uncertainties in parameter values are of equal importance in influencing an outcome probability. We show how can determine the relative importance for the parameters and so determine where to place effort to resolve the dominant contributions to risk if it is possible to do so. Considerations of whether to acquire new information, and also whether to undertake further studies under such an uncertain environment, are used as vehicles to address these concerns of risk due to uncertainty. In general, an oil filed development project has to contend with all the above types of risk and uncertainty. It is therefore of importance to have quantitative measures of risk so that one can compare and contrast the various effects, and so that corporate decision-makers can use the information in a rational manner as they seek to enhance corporate profit. This paper provides such methods and measures of assessing risk.
INTRODUCTION
The previous four papers in this series (Lerche and Noeth, 2002 a, b, c, d) have dealt with specific situations concerning the need to acquire more information or to undertake further studies in attempts to improve reserves and their production in developed oil fields. However, those four papers in the series treated all parameters in estimates of worth for the field as being absolutely deterministic, i.e. precisely known. In fact, such an assumption is, arguably, one of the weakest links in any attempts to assess the worth of acquiring new information or performing further studies in a developed field because one does not know, as opposed to surmise, the future. The point here is that if one had complete knowledge of the field under production then there would be no need to decide whether to acquire new information to improve resolution. Equally, there would be no need to decide whether to undertake further studies because the outcome would already be known, if one had perfect knowledge.
It is precisely because one does not have such knowledge that decisions must be made on the need to commit further money to the field In order to determine whether more producible reserves are available. And such decisions have to be made with incomplete knowledge of the consequences because the parameters guiding such determinations are uncertain. If this were not sufficient cause in and of itself for concern, there are also the concerns of uncertain selling price of oil from the fieldboth the reserves in place plus any future reserves one hopes to find, and the future estimates of reserves are also uncertain, else there would be no need to acquire new information or to undertake further studies because newly acquired information does not resolve completely the situation.
To be sure, prior to making decisions whether to proceed with new acquisition or indeed further studies, corporate management is usually provided with estimates from the economic risking group within the corporation of the various probabilities, costs and potential gains. However, such estimates are never perfect. Indeed, based upon much historical evidence, it could be argued that the estimates are very far indeed from perfect. The biggest difficulty is that the corporate decision-makers usually require precise numbers from which to make their decisions. And the second biggest difficulty is that those who provide the estimates are often driven by the corporate requirements to provide single precise values for parameters for which they can only estimate a range. In addition, there is a great danger in using only the expected value as a measure of the worth of a project as we shall also show. The point here is that the expected value does not contain any information at all about the uncertainty (risk) of the system being considered and so gives the decision-makers no information about the uncertainty contained in any decision they make.
We consider these two groups of problems in this paper with the first focus being on the expected value and the second on the relative contribution and relative importance.
A. THE WORTH OF RESOLVING UNCERTAINTY
Aspects concerning the risk of a project are often not included in projecting the value or benefit expected of a project. Three measures, involving the variance around the expected value, the volatility, and the cumulative probability of making a profit, are shown to be the correct way to characterize the risk. This procedure allows one to distinguish between projects that have the same expected value and which would otherwise be considered equal in worth. In addition, the acquisition (at some cost) of further data or of further studies in attempts to resolve better the project, are both shown to depend on two factors: first, whether the information is to be acquired in order to produce desired changes in the success and failure chances of the project (which such newly acquired data may not end up doing); second, even if the data do as required, one cannot use the difference between expected values of the project in the absence and presence of the new data to provide an estimate of value-added to the project assessment. Such a determination can arise only when measures of risk and uncertainty are used in addition to expected value because expected value, on its own, does not contain the risk information required. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate these points.
a. Overview
One of the more popular devices for assessing the worth of becoming involved in a project in advance of actually doing the project is the so-called decision tree. Basically one takes the best scientific information available for a project, and computes two major components; first, the probability that one will indeed make a profit (and equally, therefore, the probability one will not make a profit); second, the cost of the project and also the likely gains to be made if indeed one does go ahead with the project. It is well known that both the probability and the gains and costs are themselves uncertain (Lerche and MacKay, 1999) ahead of actually undertaking the project. Only after the project is completed does one have the knowledge that provides ground truth information. In efforts to improve upon the uncertain situation, often a corporation will commit to collecting more data in an effort to do two things. One, to improve the probability of a successful (i.e. profitable) operation of the project from the value available without the added data and second, to reassess the scale of the likely environmental problem so that a better perception of the putative profit is available. However, the new data are not obtained without additional cost. The question of interest is: does the extra cost of the added data bring to the project either such an increase in potential worth (and also in the probability of success) as to outstrip the cost of the new data collection and interpretation, or are the probabilities of not being successful sufficiently well resolved with the new data that one does not seek further involvement? In other words, the value of the added data can be to enhance a project or to sharpen up knowledge sufficiently that a decision to be involved or not to be involved can be made more accurately.
The classic procedure for making such an estimate of value-added worth has been through the use of decision-tree methods. At its simplest level, a decision-tree, such as that depicted in Figure 1 , has two channels: a chance of success, labeled ps, and a chance of failure, labeled pf. If no other channels are available then p s + p f = 1. For the success channel one has potential gains G and a cost for the environmental project of C, while for the failure channel one has just the costs of the project C. The way one customarily assesses the worth of the project is to calculate the expected value (EV) of the two branches together as
If EV is positive then it is usually assumed that, on average, the project is worth undertaking. The problem that arises is that an average value assignment fails to distinguish three major factors: first, there is not the possibility of doing an infinite number of such projects, which is where an expected value comes from, instead one has just one chance; second, the EV so calculated is not a possible outcome of the project, when one undertakes the project the outcome is either a gain at the value G-C or it is a loss at -C; third, even if one were to use the EV as a measure of worth of the project there is no categorization of the uncertainty of this worth. Thus, a project with ps = 0.1 and gains of $250 million at a cost of $10 million would return an EV of $15 million; but a project with a success probability of 0.2, gains of only $150 million and a cost of $15 million would return precisely the same EV and, if this were to be the only criteria used, would be ranked as co-equal with the first project. Thus one has no idea of the risk of each project or, indeed, of the relative risk between projects with the same EV values. It is often taken that it is sufficient to calculate the EV of the project in the absence of data collection and also to recalculate the EV under assumptions about how the new data will resolve uncertainties better as measured through the success and failure probabilities.
Should the new EV be estimated higher than the old EV then it is often taken that acquisition of the data will improve matters and therefore the acquisition is worthwhile. Note that there are two assumptions: first that one knows, ahead of acquiring the data, precisely how the success probability will be altered by the data collection; second that it is an adequate procedure to use just the difference in the EV values to assess the worth of data collection relative to its cost. Neither of the assumptions is valid; indeed they can be so misleading as to cause major upheavals in project programs. And there is still no capability of distinguishing between two projects that return the same EV values both before and also after data collection when one uses EV as the only statistic of relevance for a decision-tree.
For example, even very recently, McMahon et al. (1999) consider the effect of seismic acquisition and further studies expenses based solely on the difference between the EV of a project with and without the extra data collection. They advocate going ahead with the seismic data costs and collection based on that EV difference, and on assessments of what the differences would be in the probability of success. Their particular illustration (McMahon et al., 1999, Appendix figure) is reproduced here in modified form (Figure 2) .
The purpose of this section of the paper is to show that there are more useful statistical measures of worth than just the EV and that introduction of such measures permits a more accurate assessment to be obtained of the risk of projects with the same EV. Such measures also allow one to obtain a better representation of project success probability and also the worth of collecting new data at some cost. Such understandings are not possible based on the EV as the sole measure of worth. 
b. Representations of Risk and Uncertainty
In addition to the EV of a project as defined above, there are three other measures that help to characterize the risk and chances of success.
Variance and Standard Error
Bearing in mind that the EV is not one of the two outcomes possible with the decisiontree of Figure 1 , the most relevant quantity to obtain is the uncertainty on EV. For the two-branch decision-tree above, the uncertainty is defined in terms of the standard error of EV. As is well known (Lerche and MacKay, 1999) , the second moment, E 2 , of the two-branch system is given by
so that the variance, s 2 , is then given in general by
which corresponds to an uncertainty (standard error) on EV of ± s . For the two-branch decision-tree of Figure 1 one then obtains
The use of the standard error tells one how uncertain the EV is; a small value of s relative to EV means that the expected value is well determined; a large value of s relative to EV means that there is considerable uncertainty on EV. Thus the inclusion of s in the process of risking projects enables one to identify which projects are riskier than others even if they have identical EV values. For instance, in the example given above where one had two projects with the same EV of $15million, one has s = $60million for the project with potential gains of $150million, whereas one has s = $75million for the project with potential gains of $250million. While both have the same EV, the first project is less risky in terms of uncertainty on EV than the lower probability of success but higher potential gains project. Hence the use of standard error provides a quantitative measure lifting the degeneracy that would otherwise exist on projects with the same EV and also providing a measure of the accuracy of EV as a parameter capable of quantifying a project's worth.
Volatility
As a device for assessing the quality of the risk of a project a combination of standard error and EV can be used, named the volatility, v, defined by
The volatility provides a measure of the accuracy of the EV value. A volatility much less than unity (v<<1) indicates that there is but little uncertainty in EV and so it can be used as an accurate representation of the worth of a project. However, a volatility much larger than unity (v>>1) indicates that there is considerable uncertainty, and so the use of EV as a representative measure of the worth of a project is severely compromised. Basically what is happening in the case of high volatility is that the EV value is so far removed from either the success branch worth or the failure branch worth that there is really very little relevance to EV as a characteristic yardstick of a project's value. For instance in the two cases above, the first project has a volatility of 4 while the second has a volatility of 5, so that both projects are fairly high risk relative to using EV as the project worth measure, and the second project is 25% riskier than the first (volatility ratio of 5/4), relative to using volatility as the measure of risk.
c. Probability of Profit
Based on only the EV and the standard error information, s, for a project, one can write the equivalent Gaussian probability, P (W), that the project should return a worth greater than or equal to a specified value, W, as
which, with the substitution x = EV +2 1/2 s u, can be rewritten in the more transparent form
where B = (W -EV)/(2 1/2 s ). If one asks for the probability of making a profit of EV or greater then W=EV (and so B=0) so that P (EV)=50%, as it should. One of the conventional uses of this cumulative probability measure of worth is to ask for the probability of making any profit at all, i.e. W=0, corresponding to B= -1/(2 1/2 v). Thus there is a relatively tight intertwining of EV, standard error s, volatility v, and probability of profit measured by equation (6). Each of the three measures uses different combinations of EV and standard error in order to provide different perspectives on the worth of going ahead with involvement in a project and of assessing the risk of the project. In particular, it is clear that such measures provide a much sharper picture of what is occurring with a project than does the EV alone, which can be extremely ambiguous, does not include the riskiness of the project, and often does not bear much resemblance to the possible outcomes of a project-a major deficit which is compensated for using the other three measures.
APPLICATION TO THE QUESTION: IS VALUE ADDED?
The application of the above measures of risk is of considerable use when evaluating the worth of acquiring more seismic data, or of doing further studies, in order to refine the estimate of the worth of a project. This sort of concern is generally referred to as the value of added information. In particular, in this section we work through an application of these risk procedures using Figure 2 , modified from McMahon et al. (1999) . Consider then the upper decision-tree of Figure 2 , labeled A. As noted on the figure, EV A = $15million. Using the procedure of Section B of this chapter it is then a simple matter to show that s A = $71.4million, so that the volatility of the upper section of the decision-tree is v A = 4.76, considerably in excess of unity. Thus EV A is extremely poorly determined and, indeed, the corresponding probability of making any profit is only P (0) A = 58.4%, making the project one of high risk and not very likely to be worthwhile.
Consider then the lower decision-tree of Figure 2 , labeled B. Here one can spend an amount of $3million for a new seismic survey and also an extra amount of $1million for further studies in an attempt to improve the resolution of the project. If one does so then the probability parameters of the project are changed as shown on part B of Figure 2 . The question is whether such an expenditure of money is worthwhile. A total of $4 million more is being spent than would have been the case if one had just used the upper A part of the decision-tree to decide on corporate involvement in the project. While the lower B part of the decision-tree diagram is considerably more complex than the upper A part, the statistical measures to extract are just EV B and s B . Now EV B has already been calculated by McMahon et al. (1999) and is EV B = $18.6million. The difference in the EV values for the A and B branches of the Figure 2 decision-tree is not an accurate measure of the value added without including the attendant uncertainty. Unfortunately the EV in either the A or B branches of the decision-tree is not an accurate measure of the prospect worth because each has a large uncertainty as measured by its standard error. In the case of the B branch it can be shown using Figure 2 and the calculation method given above that s B = $66.02million, so that there is still considerable uncertainty on EV B because the volatility is now v B = 3.55. While reduced compared to the value of 4.76 relevant for the A branch, the volatility is still large compared to unity and so the project is still extremely risky. The relative improvement in risk, as measured by the ratio of volatilities (3.55/4.76), is some 25%, so that it is true that the project uncertainty has been reduced by the acquisition of the survey and the cost of the further studies. However, the improvement has not converted the project into one in which there is a high chance of it being profitable. Indeed, using equation (6) one can calculate the cumulative probability of turning any profit at all for the B branch is P (0) B = 61.2%-only a 2.8% change only a 2.8% change in the probability of profit estimate from the A branch obtained in the absence of spending $4 million on the new seismic survey and the further studies. And the chance of being profitable is still not very far above the 50:50 break-even probability value of EV or greater. In the A branch one has only an extra 8.4% chance of making any profit at all, and the B branch only improves matter to an extra 11.2% above the 50% chance of getting a return at EV or greater. There is a considerable expenditure of extra money ($4 million) for virtually no change in the conditions or resolution of the project. And this statement can be quantified easily because the variance on the value-added can be written
which, for the values s A 2 = 71.4 2 , and s B 2 = 66.02 2 , yields the uncertainty measure on the mean value-added (V A = $ 3.6million) of s VA = $97.24million, reflecting directly the large uncertainties of the EV values as representative measures of the A and B channels.
Correspondingly, the volatility of the value-added mean estimate is s VA /V A = 27.01 which is extremely large compared to unity, strongly suggesting that there is no meaning to the $3.6 million difference between the A and B branches because the uncertainty is so large on both of the EV values. One can also compute the cumulative probability that one should spend anything at all on acquisition of new data and further studies. The calculation basically uses the same cumulative probability method as given in the previous section; one finds that the probability one should not spend any extra money is 48.5%. And the probability that a value of $3.6 million or greater will be brought to the project is only 50%. In short, the expression of mean value-added is not very trustworthy because of its large uncertainty. At one standard error uncertainty the value-added can range from a positive value of $(3.6 + 97.24) million=$100.84 million, all the way to $(3.6-97.24) million = -$93.64 million. This range is so large compared to the mean value of VA that one really has no indication that acquiring a new seismic survey and also doing further studies is either adding to or detracting from the project worth obtaining in the absence of spending the $4 million extra for such new information. In short, when uncertainties are allowed for, the acquisition and further studies do not better resolve the project. They should not be undertaken.
When it is also remembered that there is uncertainty on the project parameters for success probabilities, and also on the potential gains that could accrue (due to both future economic uncertainties and also due to scientific uncertainties in the estimates of probabilities and the costs of the project), and when due allowance is taken of the facts that the improvements in the probability values on the B branch are only what one hopes will be achieved if the new seismic survey and also the further studies are undertaken-and so are subject to even more uncertainty, then it would seem that the so-called improvement of 2.8% in probability of profit is buried in the "noise" caused by the uncertainty of the parameters. The project risk has not been changed substantially. No survey or further studies should be undertaken; the extra cost of $4 million far outweighs the potential improvement estimated to occur, and does little to nothing to lower the risk of the project to any significant degree.
d. Summary
The purpose of this section has been to show that using just the expected value of a project is an extremely dangerous thing to do if one is interested in evaluating the worth of a project and its risk together with the likelihood the project will prove profitable. The quintessential reason is that the EV does not represent one of the possible outcomes of the project and, because one does not have the luxury of undertaking an infinite number of trials (for which the EV would indeed represent the average of all outcomes), then one must include some measure of the uncertainty around the EV. Failure to do so means that one has absolutely no idea how risky a project is, nor does one have any idea of its profit potential. Neither of these factors is included in the expected value, which is not one of the possible outcomes for a single project and so does not represent fairly how a single project should be risked. This point was made using an illustration of two projects with the same EV but very different risk factors, as measured by the standard error of the EV and also by the volatility.
In addition, the point was made, with a modified example from McMahon et al (1999) , that acquiring additional information through a new seismic survey and further studies, cannot be addressed using only the EV for the extra value such an endeavor would bring to sharper definition of the project in the absence and presence of the newly acquired information. In particular, the changes in the estimated probabilities of success and failure are only estimates, made prior to the acquisition and further studies. One does not know to what extent the information obtained would really change parameters to the desired values. And, even then, one has to work through not just a difference in estimated EV values in the presence and absence of the new information, but one must, more properly, take into account the uncertainty of the EV values. In this way one correctly estimates volatility and profit probability for the project incorporating some measure of the uncertainty of the EV. Further, there is uncertainty on all parameters entering such project assessments from both future economic concerns of uncertainty and also because of scientific uncertainties concerning the parameters of the project. This aspect of the general problem has already been well developed in the oil exploration area (Lerche and MacKay, 1999) . The procedures developed there can be taken over, almost wholesale, to the theater of oil field development problems as we show in the next section of this paper.
As a consequence of the above arguments taken in toto, it would appear to be less than responsible to use only the expected value to characterize a project when risk and uncertainty need to be included to allow informed decisions to be made in a logical manner on the potential worth and potential losses. The expected value, used on its own, does not permit any such representation, and that has been the point of this section.
B. UNCERTAINTY OF PARAMETERS
This section of the paper is concerned with assessing the risk brought to a project by the uncertainty of the individual parameters that enter into the assessment. As we have remarked already, none of the parameters that enter the decision tree of figure 2 are particularly well determined, although some presumably have less uncertainty than others. But it is not just the relative uncertainty of each parameter that is important; rather it is the uncertainty brought to estimates of worth and probability of improving profit that are the important issues. Because the formulae determining such factors are highly nonlinear in most of the parameter values, it is not necessarily the case that a parameter with high relative uncertainty produces the highest relative uncertainty contribution to the estimated worth and probability of obtaining that worth. To illustrate how such factors can be handled we take as a nominal situation the parameter values given in Table 1 , but with the proviso that each parameter is allowed to vary by ±20% around its nominal value given in Table 1 . Note. However, that one cannot arrange all parameters sit in such ranges because of interdependencies; for instance for a success probability and a failure probability that sum to unity only one can be chosen independently to vary with the other being required to follow suit. Asterisks in Table  1 mark the variables chosen to be the independent components. The sort of uncertainties that arises in this section of the paper are not due to the fact that there are possible pathways for different outcomes-as exhibited in Part A of the paper-but rather due to the fact that for each pathway there is uncertainty on the outcome value because the parameters for that pathway are themselves uncertain. Thus a set of choices for each parameter would yield a set of outcome values, and so there will be uncertainty on each and every outcome possible due to this uncertainty even if only one pathway obtained. So the sort of uncertainty here is one of statistical parameter range and not one of pathway uncertainty per se, although the fact that there are various pathways producing different outcomes means that there is then extra uncertainty on the expected values detailed in Part A.
To provide a simple illustration of the relative importance of uncertainties in the parameter values, we have chosen each asterisked parameter in Table 1 to be represented by a triangular probability distribution centered at the nominal value reported in Table 1 and extending 20% on each side of the nominal. Monte Carlo procedures can then be employed effectively to provide a suite of outputs based on random sampling of the various parameters. Crystal Ball ® is an efficient numerical program for allowing rapid completion of this Monte Carlo procedure with the basic program handling the risking, which program has been given in earlier papers in this series and to which the interested reader is referred for details.
Crystal Ball ® can also be used with other than triangular choices for the underlying parameter distributions should one wish to explore the effect of such different distributions on the outputs. However, in the interests of displaying the basic patterns of response we have not incorporated such more general considerations here, although they should be fully explored in applications to cases of significant potential worth, as we have noted elsewhere (Lerche and Noeth, 2002e) .
For each situation, the Monte Carlo scheme was run 500 times (Tests were done to ensure that stabilization of statistical outcomes had been reached more than adequately for 500 runs by running some cases to 1000 and even 2000 runs and comparing statistical results). The resulting output variables were then considered from two perspectives: the cumulative probability distribution of an output of interest; and the relative contributions of each of the parameters to the variance of the result. In this way one has an idea of the "spread" in results caused by allowing variables to have a degree of uncertainty and also one can determine which of the variables is causing the greatest degree of variability of a given output o interest. This second aspect is of great economic importance because it allows one to determine where to place effort to narrow down the range of a variable in order to improve the uncertainty on particular outputs of interest in the decision-making process, and also which variables to concentrate on in order to do so.
We concentrate here on six particular outputs to show the sort of information that can be gleaned from such exercises. First considered is the expected value (EV) in the absence of acquiring any further information. In Part A we showed that this EV would have the precise value of $15MM if no parameters varied. However, because we now allow for variations, as marked in Table 1 , there is a range of the EV. Figure 3a shows the cumulative probability of obtaining an expected value at or below particular values. To be noted from the figure is that there is now only about 13% chance the EV will be $15MM or less, and there is a 50% chance the EV will be above about $19.5MM. The effect of the ± 20% fluctuations is clear in the parameters influencing the EV. In addition, figure 3b shows the relative importance (RI) of each of the parameters in bringing about the range of behaviors for the EV, as measured by the contribution to the variance of the EV. The uncertainty in the future estimated gains plus the uncertainty in the probability of success in realizing those gains together make up about 80% of the uncertainty in the EV with the estimated gains contributing 47% and the probability of future gains about 39%. The clear message here is that if one wishes to really do a good job of assessing the worth of just going ahead with the project and not involving any other costs for acquisition, then it behooves one to attempt to narrow down the range of uncertainty of both the estimated gains and the probability of achieving those gains. All other considerations are secondary. However, it may be thought that it is not possible to achieve those objectives without committing to acquiring new information. Accordingly, the second component looked at is whether the cumulative probability of achieving a given profit level is higher with acquired information than without such acquisition. Figure 4a shows this behavior indicating that there is a considerable difference, with even the 50% chance yielding an estimated worth with acquired information about $47MM more than if one does not acquire. There is, of course, considerable uncertainty on this estimate, ranging from around $43MM at 10% cumulative probability to around $53MM at 90% chance, but the estimated effect is significantly positive. The major contributors to the uncertainty on this cumulative probability are shown in figure 4b , where it can be seen that again the base case uncertainty on anticipated reserves to be found and also the probability of finding the reserves dominate the uncertainty on the chances the acquisition of information will lead to a higher return than when one does not acquire. However, the total contribution of these two categories is now not as high as it was in the case of the EV without further information, amounting to just over 50% of the total variance on the cumulative probability. In this case, the uncertainty on the probability to abandon the project based on further studies, and the probability that the project will succeed based on the further studies, together add about 20% to the total variance. As a third component, if one now considers the probability distribution of the EV after acquisition one notes that it was at $15.2MM when the nominal values of Table  1 were used but, as shown on figure 5a ,now has about a 50% chance of lying above $15.3 MM with about a 90% chance of lying below $21MM. Note that this EV range is considerably smaller than that for the EV in the absence of acquisition, reflecting the substantial increase (from 0.15 to 0.30) in the nominal probability of success, which lowers then the uncertainty on the EV. This point is brought out also by inspection of figure 5b , showing the relative importance contributions to the EV. It is now the probability of success and also the probability to abandon that control the uncertainty in the EV, which is very unlike the situation without any acquisition, indicating that one should improve those two estimates rather than any others if one wishes to narrow the range of uncertainty of the EV. But given the remarks above, and in Part A, concerning the unreliability of the EV taken on its own without including its uncertainty, it may be that one would choose to use as a more stable and accurate yardstick of worth in any decision-making process, the cumulative probability that the value with acquisition exceeds the value without acquisition.
For the last component of worth measures, consider the probability that the worth after further studies is greater than the worth without undertaking such studies (one could also consider the associated EV for this situation but such has not been included here because the salient points are made just as well with the probability measure). Figure 6a provides the cumulative probability curve for the chance that the worth with further studies will exceed the worth without such studies, while figure 6b provides the corresponding relative importance contributions to the uncertainty (as measured by the variance). In this situation one can see from figure 6b that the dominant contributions to the variance are provided by the probability of success after further studies (at almost 38%), the probability to abandon before further studies (at about 35%) and the probability to abandon after further studies (at about 18%); all other factors are small contributors to the uncertainty on the chances of the worth with further studies exceeding the worth without such studies. Figure 6a also shows that the probability of worth with the further studies has at least a 50% chance of exceeding the worth without such studies by about $56MM. This is indicating that IF the estimates of the success probability after further studies are indeed almost doubled relative to not acquiring information and performing the further studies. Then it makes good economic sense to undertake such endeavors because their costs are low relative to the increase in anticipated gains ($3MM for acquired information and $1MM for further studies, which, even allowing for the ±20% uncertainty, do not really impact the anticipated increase in gains to be made).
C. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The major question remains as to whether the estimates are realistic for the increase, in particular, of the estimated success chance. The point here is that until one does indeed go ahead and commit to the acquisition of new information and also the further studies one does not know, as opposed to surmise, that the parameter values will be so changed as to produce a large increase in anticipated gains. And that stumbling block is, of course, where the decision-makers have to decide based on whatever criteria they use (past precedent, knowledge of their scientists skills, corporate risk aversion, etc) whether the acquisition of new information will indeed raise the anticipated gains to a sufficiently high level that it makes the acquisition and further studies worthwhile. The best that can be done is to run scenarios, as we have just done, illustrating the consequences of different assumptions. What we have NOT done in this paper is to look at systematic variations of parameters, each with an uncertainty, and see what nominal values are needed to justify proceeding with any action, including abandonment. Some such estimates have been given in the previous papers of this series, and more will be given in future papers, of the influence of systematic variations of parameters on decisions. But such was not the purpose here; rather we were geared to understanding the uncertainty aspects of such oil field problems and to showing how one can include not only the uncertainty on mean values due to different pathway outcomes, but also the effect of uncertainty of basic parameters around nominal, but fixed, values in changing the appreciation of how one measures the probability of changing worth. Clearly one must also be concerned with the change in the nominal estimated parameters (for instance a success probability estimate of 0.3 or of 0.5 influence the assessment of worth differently, even when both are allowed ±20% uncertainty-or perhaps even different levels of uncertainty and also different uncertainties to either side of the nominal value (a skewed distribution of parameter assessment).
The general complexity of estimating worth, and its highly nonlinear dependence on a multitude of parameters, makes it difficult to include all systematic variations, all possible ranges of uncertainty, and all different distribution classes from which the uncertainties can be drawn, in any attempt to determine the relative importance of each and every such effect on the estimates of worth and the associated risk. This paper has discussed but two facets of this general problem: uncertainty due to different pathways and uncertainty due to uncertain parameters. The more general problem, while fascinating, would take us too far afield in this paper and defeat the purpose of showing how these two particular aspects can be handled quantitatively, which was the main aim here.
